Non-philosophers’ Judgements of Metaphysical Explanations are Context-Sensitive
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Empirical investigation of the conditions under which people prefer, or disprefer, causal explanation, has suggested to many that our judgements about what causally explains what are context-sensitive in a number of ways. This has led many to suppose that whether or not a causal explanation obtains depends on contextual factors: that causal explanation is context-sensitive. Surprisingly, most accounts of metaphysical explanation, by contrast, suppose it to be context insensitive. Only recently have accounts been developed of metaphysical explanation on which it is context-sensitive. To date, however, there is no empirical evidence about the context sensitivity of metaphysical explanation. In what follows we test the judgements of non-philosophers, and find that amongst non-philosophers, at least, metaphysical explanations are context-sensitive. We then consider the implications of this finding for theorising about metaphysical explanation.
Source: Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
Authors: Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller
Institution: Aarhus University
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4403941123