Duties to Self, Consent, and Respect in Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: In Kantian ethics, do we wrong someone when our use of them requires that they violate a duty to self, even when they have consented to that use? In this paper, I answer this question in the negative. Consent that constitutes a violation of a duty to self is impermissible yet normatively transformative. But it also matters how consent was obtained. For example, it matters whether consent is solicited or unsolicited, whether our action amounts to complicity with the violation, and how the act of consent is shaped by the broader contours of the relationship the parties stand in to each other. In Kantian terms, we might fail in our duties of respect to others even when our interactions with them are consensual. So many, but not all, consensual interactions in which one person violates a duty to self are also instances in which they are interpersonally wronged.
Source: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Luke J. Davies
Institution: University of Oxford
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Award: G1095939411
OpenAlex ID: W4404001166