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Matching workers to firms facing budget constraints

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: We study a many-to-one matching model with salaries in which firms face budget constraints. Mongell and Roth (1986) show that when firms face a budget constraint, a stable matching may not exist. We introduce an algorithm to find a strong stable matching by changing the budget of firms such that the total budget remains the same and each firm’s budget change is bounded by the value of at most one worker for that firm.

Source: Economics Letters

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112048

Authors: Amirreza Ahmadzadeh, Behrang Kamali Shahdadi

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,980

OpenAlex ID: W4404117884

FWCI:

Cites: 5

Cited by:

Related to: 10