Work

Avoiding Moral Commitment

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT I argue that relaxed moral realists are not ontologically committed to moral properties. Regardless of whether we tie ontological commitment to quantification, entailment, or truthmaking, if moral properties are not explanatory (as relaxed realists claim), then moral truths do not require moral properties. This permits a nominalist form of relaxed realism that is both simpler and more ecumenical than extant formulations. The possibility of such a position places pressure on the ontology of competing views—and helps focus attention on the critical and underexplored explanatory element of the relaxed realist’s program.

Source: Journal of the American Philosophical Association

DOI: 10.1017/apa.2024.11

Author: MILES TUCKER

Institution: Virginia Commonwealth University

Language: English

Topic: Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,450

OpenAlex ID: W4404330847

FWCI: 5.704

Cites: 48

Cited by: 2

Related to: 10