Jusqu’où vouloir détecter la pollution ?
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: This article examines the relationship between executive remuneration and investment in innovation in listed French companies. Drawing on agency theory and contractual finance, it analyses whether executives are genuinely ‘paid to innovate’ or whether their remuneration serves more as insurance against the risks associated with R&D projects. The study distinguishes between three components of remuneration — total remuneration, short-term remuneration and long-term remuneration — and compares high-tech firms with low-tech firms. The empirical analysis covers 174 French listed companies between 2014 and 2022, representing 1,262 firm-year observations. The results show, firstly, that executives in high-tech firms are not better remunerated than those in low-tech firms; on the contrary, their total remuneration and short-term remuneration appear to be lower. Secondly, in high-tech firms, only total remuneration is positively associated with R&D intensity. Neither short-term nor long-term remuneration shows a significant link with innovation. The article concludes that, in the French context, executive remuneration does not function primarily as a targeted incentive mechanism to promote innovation, particularly via stock options, but rather as a general mechanism to compensate for the managerial risk associated with innovative activities.
Source: Zilsel
DOI: 10.3917/zil.014.0183
Author: Justine Berthod
Language: French
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4404371852