Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: . We study a stopping game of preemption type between two players who both act under uncertain competition. In this framework we introduce, and study the effect of, (i) asymmetry of payoffs, allowing, e.g., for different investment costs, and (ii) consolation, i.e., partial compensation to the forestalled stopper. In general, this setting does not offer an explicit equilibrium. Instead, we provide a general verification theorem, which we then use to explore various situations in which a solution can be constructed so that an equilibrium is obtained.
DOI: 10.1137/24m1708498
Authors: Erik Ekström, Yuqiong Wang
Institutions: Uppsala University, University of Michigan
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4404405013