The Digital Markets Act: A partial solution to antitrust’s remedy problem
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Antitrust remedies in digital markets have shown little effectiveness. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) offers a partial solution by establishing a multi-level remedial pyramid that addresses several of the challenges the Commission faced when remedying antitrust infringements. At the base of this pyramid are the DMA's obligations, which embed ex ante remedies that are faster and more prescriptive than antitrust remedies. The second level consists in regulatory dialogue, an open and iterative specification procedure that can mitigate information asymmetries and futureproof remedies. The third level is the non-compliance procedure, which complements the regulatory dialogue. At the pyramid's apex is the systematic non-compliance procedure. It empowers the Commission to impose ex post remedies, which can be more forceful than their EU competition law counterparts. Although the DMA enhances the Commission's remedial process and powers compared to EU competition law, it is crucial for the Commission to exercise its authority judiciously. The Commission's focus should be on the intermediate layers of the remedial pyramid, particularly the regulatory dialogue.
Source: Common Market Law Review
DOI: 10.54648/cola2024103
Authors: Friso Bostoen, David van Wamel
Institutions: Tilburg University, Leiden University
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4404688312