Work

Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: For the provision of divisible public goods, relatively weak restrictions on the domain of a strategy-proof social choice function are identified that ensure that its range is bounded. Domain restrictions are also identified for which strategy-proofness implies that the range and the option sets of a social choice function are compact. To illustrate the usefulness of these results, it is shown how a theorem about generalized median voter schemes due to Barberà, Massó, and Serizawa can be established without their assumption that the range of a social choice function is compact provided that the tops of the preferences are not restricted to be finite.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013

Authors: Shigehiro Serizawa, John A. Weymark

Institutions: Osaka University of Economics, Vanderbilt University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,540

Funder: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science