Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: A foundational assumption of contemporary cognitive science is that perceptual processing involves inferential transitions between representational states. However, it remains controversial whether accounts of this kind extend to modalities whose perceptual status is a matter of debate. In particular, it remains controversial whether we should attribute inferential mechanisms to the sensory processing underpinning (human) pain experiences. This paper argues that, contrary to recent proposals in the philosophy and science of pain, pain processing is not mediated by inferential transitions. To this end, I show that standard motivations for inferentialism—including appeal to underdetermination, illusion, cue combination, cognitive penetration, perceptual constancy, and invariance—do not carry over to pain. Instead, I suggest that pain's sensory processing may be better characterised as an idiosyncratic form of transduction, distinguishing it both from paradigmatic perceptual modalities and canonical transducers.
DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13134
Author: Laurenz Casser
Institution: University of Sheffield
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,760
Funder: Leverhulme Trust
Award: G5693204856
OpenAlex ID: W4405000556