Making Local Courts Work: The Judicial Recentralization Reform and Local Protectionism in China
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Despite extensive comparative research on the relationship between government and courts, the independence and administration of local judiciaries remain understudied. Is a decentralized system—where local governments appoint judges and finance court budgets—more conducive to court autonomy than a centralized system that allows higher-level governments to control local judiciaries? We examine a reform in China that gradually recentralizes control over local courts. Using a difference-in-differences design with a unique dataset of lawsuits from listed firms (2012--2018), we find that recentralization diminishes local officials' ability to interfere with court decision-making and reduces advantages for local litigants. These results suggest that recentralization can help insulate courts from government influence and enhance judicial independence under certain conditions.
Source: The Journal of Politics
DOI: 10.1086/734246
Authors: Zhenhuan Lei, Yishuang Li
Institution: Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4405229843