Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: Yakov Feygin offers a fresh and nuanced examination of the Soviet Union's economic trajectory during the Cold War, from Stalin's death up to the country's collapse.Feygin argues that the USSR's collapse was significantly influenced by internal contradictions within its political economy.Soviet efforts to transition from a command model to a consumer-oriented society, he contends, led to unresolved tensions within the policymaking apparatus.Feygin's analysis highlights how the failure to reconcile competing visions within the Soviet leadership contributed to the nation's decline and ultimate dissolution.Such visions were many: retain the old modeling full?Tinker with it while conserving its basic structure?Move more boldly in the direction of decentralization and of giving leeway to market forces?Building a Ruin delves into the complexities of Soviet economic reforms, and specifically into the ideological battles among policy advisers and experts, which, the author posits, did influence policymaking.It furthers our understanding of the inner workings of the Soviet economy, provides new insights into the Soviet expert community and into its relationship with actual policymaking, and thereby further demystifies the decline and collapse of the USSR.The main contours of the story are known: paraphrasing Stephen Kotkin, "armageddon" was averted because the Cold War did not resolve itself militarily.The spectre of thermonuclear war did not concretize itself because, after nearly three decades of slowing growth and then eventual stagnation, the USSR ceased to exist in a largely peaceful way (with notable exceptions ranging from Moldova to the Caucasus and Central Asia).It did so because its last leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, renounced party dictatorship, Marxism-Leninism, the messianic goal of building communism, and the command economy.One of the book's core theses is that collapse was not the inevitable result of the inherent faults of the communist system; unresolved tensions within its political economy were also to blame.These tensions arose as reformers sought to implement economic policies emphasizing productivity, growth, and consumer goods availability, akin to Western capitalist economies.This meant transitioning away from the Stalinist model of mass mobilization, heavy industrialization, and centralized administrative direction.However, entrenched Stalinist institutions and conservative political factions resisted these changes, resulting in policy inconsistencies, stagnation, and eventual instability.The Soviet attempt to mimic Western achievements was not born out of abstruse ideological priorities, but rather very pressing necessities.
Source: The Russian Review
DOI: 10.1111/russ.12725
Author: Giovanni Cadioli
Institution: University of Padua
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,760
OpenAlex ID: W4405348667