Work

Teacher Labor Market Policy and the Theory of the Second Best

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: We estimate a matching model of teachers and elementary schools with rich data on teachers' applications and principals' ratings from a large, urban district in North Carolina. Both teachers’ and principals’ preferences deviate from those that would maximize the achievement of economically disadvantaged students: teachers prefer schools with fewer disadvantaged students, and principals' ratings are weakly related to teacher effectiveness. In equilibrium, these two deviations combine to produce a surprisingly equitable current allocation, where teacher quality is balanced across advantaged and disadvantaged students. To close achievement gaps, policies that address deviations on one side alone are ineffective or harmful, while policies that address both could substantially increase the achievement of disadvantaged students.

Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics

DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjae042

Authors: Michael Bates, Michael Dinerstein, Andrew C Johnston, Isaac Sorkin

Institutions: University of California, Riverside, National Bureau of Economic Research, Duke University, University of California, Merced, Stanford University

Language: English

Topic: School Choice and Performance

Subfield: Education

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Reduced inequalities, Quality education

Open Access status: green

Funders: Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, University of California, Riverside, University of California Merced