Work

Add and rule

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: We suggest a new mechanism to explain political and economic inequality in resource rich countries. The mechanism is based on the premise that migrants are treated less generously in autocracies than in democracies. As a consequence, democracies want fewer migrants than autocracies. After democratization a new government may therefore start out with (potentially many) more migrants than their preferred level. These excess migrants, inherited from the autocracy, represent a costly legacy that makes democracy less attractive to citizens. With democracy less attractive, it is cheaper to compensate citizens for not challenging the autocratic regime. Not only that — by adding even more migrants, democratization becomes even less attractive, enabling the ruler to keep even more of the resource rents for himself without a threat of losing power.

Source: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106852

Authors: Halvor Mehlum, Karl Ove Moene, Gry Østenstad

Institutions: University of Oslo, University of South-Eastern Norway

Language: English

Topic: Natural Resources and Economic Development

Subfield: General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,770