Emergency Capacity Pool to Respond to Unconventional Emergencies Based on Principal–Agent Theory
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: To address the conflict of interest between the government and enterprises regarding urban emergency transportation resources in unconventional emergencies and to enhance resource allocation and response efficiency. This paper proposes a collaborative government–enterprise model for emergency transport capacity reserves and develops an incentive model based on principal–agent theory. First, by comprehensively considering enterprise characteristics, high-quality enterprises are selected to collaborate with the government in building an emergency capacity pool of social vehicles. Second, to address potential conflicts of interest between the government and enterprises within the emergency capacity pool, this paper uses principal–agent theory to analyze the interest game process under information asymmetry, constructs a corresponding incentive model, and determines the government’s optimal incentive coefficient, the enterprise’s optimal actual capacity supply ratio, and the benefit distribution between both parties. Finally, numerical simulations and sensitivity analyses were used to verify the model’s applicability. The findings reveal that transport effort cost, economic requisition compensation, and government supervision cost influence the optimal decisions and outcomes in government–enterprise interactions. This study provides theoretical guidance and managerial insights for coordinating emergency transport scheduling between the government and enterprises during unconventional emergencies.
Source: Urban Science
Authors: Na Jin, Fuyou Tan, Haiyan Wang, Ao Sang, Shipeng Wang
Institution: Wuhan University of Technology
Language: English
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,819
Funder: Strong
OpenAlex ID: W4405639940