Work

Decentralization in Autocraties

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: In a model with two regions, one rich and one poor, the allocation of net public spending is studied whereby the initial political process by which taxation and government expenditures are determined is centralized and not democratic. In stable autocracy, decentralization reforms depend on a trade-off: centralization allows a higher rate of rent extraction for the autocrat, but at the cost of reduced productivity in the poor region. Faced with democratic pressure and instability, an authoritarian regime captured by the elite will choose to implement decentralization reforms before democratization because the median voter, who typically lives in a poor rural area, will have no interest in doing so. In democracy, the welfare of the elite is higher with decentralization than with centralization, while the welfare of the poor median voter is identical in both regimes.

Source: European Economic Review

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104930

Authors: Emmanuelle Auriol, Anaïs Dahmani-Scuitti

Language: English

Topic: Local Government Finance and Decentralization

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,170

Funders: World Bank Group, Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Agence Française de Développement