Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: We consider evolutionary games in which the agent selected for update compares strategies with q neighbors, rather than a single neighbor as in standard evolutionary game theory. If all q sampled neighbors agree, then agents update their strategy using a smoothed best-response rule. Following ideas from social impact theory, we also study mathematical generalizations of the dynamics to noninteger q>0. Looking at fixed point stability and fixation times for 2×2 games with all-to-all interactions, we find that the flow changes significantly as a function of q. Further, we develop the pair approximation for the q-deformed dynamics on uncorrelated graphs. We also study games with more than two strategies, such as the rock-paper-scissors game where we show that changing q leads to the emergence of new types of flow within the simplex.
Source: Physical review. E
Authors: Christopher R. Kitching, Tobias Galla
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Awards: G1175115578, G1622782223, G1722358650, G2105336002, G2262748287, G2281333282, G300979063, G3293433185, G34346518, G3480869486, G410571670, G425668148, G451917667, G5080475149, G5204893840, G5539308778, G5967599077, G6118605381, G6368369985, G7051782649, G7084143925, DTP 2020-2021 The University of Manchester, G7283329000, G779402943, G8637239434, G929308097
OpenAlex ID: W4405833919