Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: This paper raises a worry about the non-identity intuition. As one part of the non-identity problem, the non-identity intuition tells us that when choosing between bringing a person with a good life into existence and bringing a person with a great life into existence, we have moral reason to bring the person with a great life into existence. But there is a worry to be had about the non-identity intuition. Because the non-identity intuition compares future persons exclusively in regard to their well-being, the non-identity intuition values future persons solely for the well-being enjoyed by each of them. Therefore, or so the worry goes, the non-identity intuition fails to be compatible with what it means to value persons for their own sake.
Source: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: Jessica J.T. Fischer
Institution: University of Bristol
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4405866930