On-the-job wage dynamics
Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: This paper assesses wage setting and wage dynamics in a search and matching framework where (i) workers and firms on occasion meet multilaterally; (ii) workers can recall previous encounters with firms; and (iii) firms cannot commit to future wages and workers cannot commit to not searching on the job. The resulting progression of wages (from firms paying just enough to keep their workers) yields a compensation structure consistent with well established but difficult to reconcile observations on pay dynamics within jobs at firms. Along with wage tenure effects, serial correlation in wage changes and wage growth are negatively correlated with initial wages.
Source: Journal of Economic Theory
Author: Eric Smith
Institution: University of Essex
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,810
OpenAlex ID: W4405925877
