Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Many philosophers claim that we have a duty to know our motives. However, prominent theories of the mind suggest that we can’t. Such scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives is based on psychological evidence. I show that this evidence only mandates scepticism about knowledge of one’s motives if we rely on a mistaken assumption which I call ‘the myth of the one true motive’. If we reject this myth, we see that there is space to plausibly interpret the empirical data such that knowledge of one’s motives is difficult, but not impossible.
Source: The Monist
Author: Pablo Hubacher Haerle
Institution: University of Cambridge
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $4,036
OpenAlex ID: W4406288294