Year: 2024
Type: article
Abstract: The paper explores the Kantian concept of the intelligible deed. Kant distinguishes between intelligible application and empirical application in the concepts of freedom, action and guilt. The notion of evil is linked to the willingness to do evil (Hang zum Bösen) and the notion of intelligible deed. The latter, however, is highly problematic. The second part of the paper will attempt to present all the paradoxes of the concept of intelligible deed and will overview some of the possible interpretations. Finally, the paper argues that the intelligible deed can be understood as the loss of innocence, a primordial event through which the moral person with self-consciousness is born, and which Kant links to responsibility for evil.
Source: Kellék Filozófiai folyóirat
Authors: ELTE BTK Filozófia Intézete, Tamás Ullmann
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4407189045