Work

Distributive politics and asymmetric participation

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: How do distributive politics affect participation under incomplete information? We theorize a novel mechanism that we call asymmetric participation, which explains participation as a self-selection process induced by a broadly targeted welfare benefit. Incomplete information about the de facto allocation of benefits causes asymmetric participation. When citizens expect particularistic distribution and access to the benefit depends on voter registration, supporters of the incumbent, who supplies the benefit, self-select into the electorate. This creates an incumbency advantage. We illustrate this argument using the case of the Renda Básica de Cidadania (RBC) in Maricá, Brazil, the largest unconditional cash transfer program in Latin America. Based on qualitative evidence, we develop a formal model, which we test against novel survey data. We find that under the de facto procedure of implementation, supporters of the incumbent supplying the RBC, self-select into the electorate, and engage more in activities that signal party loyalty.

Source: Journal of Theoretical Politics

DOI: 10.1177/09516298241312347

Authors: Philipp Kerler, Victor Araújo

Institutions: University of Zurich, University of Reading

Language: English

Topic: Electoral Systems and Political Participation

Subfield: Political Science and International Relations

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Reduced inequalities, Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,650