Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This article addresses the question of whether lying inherently requires the expression of objective falsehood. While traditional subjectivist approaches focus on the divergence between a speaker’s beliefs and their statements, some contemporary theorists of lying argue that lying necessitates objectively false utterances. I offer a critical analysis of six thought experiments to illuminate the intuitiveness of the subjectivist claim. In explaining the intuitiveness of the traditional view of lying, I point to its fundamentally moral nature—namely, that lying is rooted in acts of will rather than external outcomes.
Source: Laboratorium Mentis
DOI: 10.52097/lm.9485
Author: Artur Szutta
Institution: University of Gdańsk
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4407625755