Work

Mapping content: why cognitive maps are non-conceptual mental states

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: Cognitive maps play a crucial role in mammalian navigation. They provide the organism with information about its own location and the locations of landmarks within known environments. Cognitive maps have yet to receive ample attention in philosophy. In this article, we argue that cognitive maps should not be understood along the lines of conceptual mental states, such as beliefs and desires. They are more plausibly understood to be non-conceptual. We clarify what is at stake in this claim, and offer two empirically-informed arguments in its favor. Both arguments submit that cognitive maps are probably non-conceptual because their representational structure seems to differ from that of conceptual mental states.

Source: Synthese

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-025-04922-x

Authors: Arieh Schwartz, Nir Fresco

Institutions: London School of Economics and Political Science, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Language: English

Topic: Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

Field: Psychology

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,190

Funders: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Israel Science Foundation, Council for Higher Education