Work

Fairness in the multi-proposer-multi-responder ultimatum game

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version of the Ultimatum Game, called the Multi-Proposer-Multi-Responder Ultimatum Game. In this model, multiple responders and proposers simultaneously interact in a one-shot game, introducing competition both within proposers and within responders. We derive subgame-perfect Nash equilibria for all scenarios and explore how these non-trivial values might provide insight into proposal and rejection behaviour experimentally observed in the context of one vs. one Ultimatum Game. Additionally, by considering the asymptotic numbers of players, we propose two potential estimates for a "fair" threshold: either 31.8% or 36.8% of the pie (share) for the responder.

Source: PLoS ONE

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0319178

Authors: Hana Krakovská, Rudolf Hanel, Mark Broom

Institutions: Complexity Science Hub, Medical University of Vienna, University of London, City, University of London

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $2,382

Funder: HORIZON EUROPE Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions