Contextualism and the truth norm
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: What should we believe? One plausible view is that we should believe what is true. Another is that we should believe what is rational to believe. I will argue that both these theses can be accounted for once we add an independently motivated contextualism about normative terms. According to contextualism, the content of ‘ought’ depends on two parameters – a goal and a modal base (or set of possible worlds). It follows that there is a sense in which we should believe truths and a sense in which we should believe what is rational to believe.
Source: Episteme
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2024.39
Author: Darren Bradley
Institution: University of Leeds
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
Funder: John Templeton Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W4408160604
