No Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Many moral realists have employed a strategy for arguing for moral realism by claiming that if epistemic normativity is categorical and that if this epistemic normativity exists, then categorical normativity exists. In this paper, we will discuss that argument, examine a way out, and respond to the objections people have recently raised in the literature. In the end, we conclude that the objections to our way out will do little in the way of motivating those who already do not believe in categorical normativity, thereby severing the power the aforementioned parity argument is designed to possess.
Source: Studia Humana
DOI: 10.2478/sh-2025-0003
Authors: Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz
Institutions: University of Kent, Arizona State University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4408165562