Mind-Independence, Realism, and Reality
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT Some metaphysically interesting notions fall outside of the realm of the mind-independent, and as such will erroneously be considered unworthy of our attention by any view that thinks only of realist metaphysics as substantive (Taylor, 2023). In this article I propose two ways of conceiving of substantive metaphysics that includes some mind-dependent phenomena. The first is to understand substantivity in terms of carving at the joints, but to take where the ‘joints’ are to depend in part on our own interests, preferences, and conceptual schemes (the joints are ours, not nature’s). The second is to think of ‘reality’ as a system of explanatory dependence that includes some suitably embedded mind-dependent phenomena, and thus to deny (if we continue to characterize realism in terms of mind-independence) that we should be realists about all of ‘reality’.
DOI: 10.1017/apa.2025.2
Author: NAOMI THOMPSON
Institution: University of Bristol
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W4408173787