Information orders in screening problems
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper studies information orders in screening models. I amend a general screening problem with a signal about the agent's type. The principal prefers one signal to another for any preferences of principal and agent if and only if the signals are ranked by Blackwell's order. Under a standard regularity condition, a novel information order – the hazard rate spread (HRS) order – characterizes a robust ranking of signals by the principal. I relate the HRS order to well-known information orders and provide sufficient conditions for other welfare measures than the principal's payoff to increase or decrease in the HRS order.
Source: Journal of Economic Theory
Author: Andreas Asseyer
Institution: Freie Universität Berlin
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,030
OpenAlex ID: W4408224306