Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT This article studies the verifiable disclosure of data by an informed expert whose bias direction is unknown to the decision maker. It shows that the expert's disclosure induces the decision maker to choose an action biased in the expert's desired direction. The pattern of manipulation depends on the weighted mass of left and right‐biased expert types with the same ideal action. All expert types with bias on the side with lower weighted mass, and a subset of types with bias on the other side, induce the choice of their ideal action; they fully manipulate. All other expert types partially manipulate.
Source: The RAND Journal of Economics
Author: Claudio Mezzetti
Institution: The University of Queensland
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,400
Funder: Australian Research Council
OpenAlex ID: W4408307840