Work

Regulating bank risk in a mobile labour market

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: This paper argues that bonus caps can be welfare improving in banking labour markets with high mobility. On the labour market, the largest banks hire the most talented traders, but they need to do so with contracts with high bonuses in order to both screen talent and to prevent poaching by smaller banks. This can lead to excessive risk taking. In some cases, it is socially optimal to prevent screening, leading to a less efficient matching of talent to banks, but also to less risk taking. Bonus caps can achieve this in a way that is both more effective and less costly than setting tighter capital constraints.

Source: Journal of Banking & Finance

DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2025.107421

Author: Anton van Boxtel

Institution: University of Vienna

Language: English

Topic: Banking stability, regulation, efficiency

Subfield: Finance

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,340