Work

Immigration Lobbying and Hold‐Up in Investment

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT This paper shows how a government sets immigration policy in the presence of entrepreneurs who undertake investment. The government and the entrepreneurs negotiate through lobbying to determine the quota of immigration and the amount of contribution to be paid to the government. In order to mitigate the underinvestment problem due to hold‐up by the entrepreneurs, we show how a government may be willing to tie its hands to an institution that constrains the immigration policies it can set. We identify conditions under which, by tying its hands to such an institution, the government can increase investment in the economy.

Source: World Economy

DOI: 10.1111/twec.13692

Author: Atisha Ghosh

Institution: University of Warwick

Language: English

Topic: Migration and Labor Dynamics

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,570