Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper raises a new problem for the widely held view that, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius, being a benevolent person necessarily entails being affectively disposed in morally relevant ways. I argue that ascribing such a view to Mencius generates an inconsistent triad with two of his central philosophical commitments on what it means to be a benevolent ruler. I then consider possible ways of resolving the triad and I argue that the most attractive option is to reject the view that a benevolent person must be affectively disposed in morally relevant ways; instead, being disposed to perform benevolent actions is enough.
Source: European Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13058
Author: Waldemar Brys
Institution: UNSW Sydney
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4408545001