Work

Persons, Agents, Patients – Conceptual Housekeeping in a World with Group Agents

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: The recognition of artificial agents such as group agents and computer AIs introduces undesirable ambiguities. With this expanded social ontology, it becomes all too easy to undergeneralize or overgeneralize when invoking concepts traditionally used to describe humans. Furthermore, prominent accounts of group agency feature criteria such that antecedent qualifying terms such as ‘individual’ and ‘group’ are irrelevant to the realization of agency itself. Yet there are obviously important moral differences between individual human beings and groups of human beings. The existence of group agents calls for a clear and explicit recognition of a distinct category: obligation-bearing social entities which lack the essential ingredient for moral worth.

Source: Topoi

DOI: 10.1007/s11245-025-10182-8

Author: David Kelley

Institution: University of Auckland

Language: English

Topic: Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,290

Funder: University of Auckland