A Four-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of Retired Power Battery Recycling Strategies Under the Low Carbon Goals
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Under the low carbon goal, recycling power batteries (PBs) from new energy vehicles (NEVs) is a crucial measure to address resource shortages and reduce carbon emissions. This study examined the insufficient collaboration among the responsible entities and the imperfections in market mechanisms within the PB recycling system. We overcome the limitations of traditional tripartite evolutionary game models by developing a four-party evolutionary game model that incorporates the government, manufacturers, recyclers, and consumers to investigate the strategic interactions within the extended producer responsibility (EPR) framework. Using MATLAB 2023a numerical simulations and Lyapunov stability analysis, we found that the system’s stability and efficiency depend on stakeholder collaboration and effective government policy guidance. The system evolves toward a Pareto optimal state when all parties adopt proactive recycling strategies. Meanwhile, ensuring substantial profits for manufacturers and recyclers is critical for the feasibility and stable operation of compliant recycling channels. While manufacturers and recyclers are more sensitive to subsidies than consumers, consumer decision-making is key to market stability. Long-term excessive subsidies may lead to diminishing marginal benefits. Strategic recommendations are provided for policymakers and stakeholders to enhance the efficiency and sustainability of the PB recycling system.
Source: World Electric Vehicle Journal
DOI: 10.3390/wevj16030187
Authors: Lijun Yang, Shuangxi Zhong, Zhenggang Ding
Institution: Hubei University of Automotive Technology
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,689
OpenAlex ID: W4408693726