Russian Foreign Policy Debates and the Conflicts in Georgia (1991–2008): Between Multilateralism and Unilateralism by CécileDruey. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2024. 210 pp. $105.00. ISBN 978‐1‐66693‐335‐2
Year: 2025
Type: book-review
Abstract: This book combines an anatomy of Russia’s foreign policy making process with a case study of Russian-Georgian relations between 1991 and 2008. It was probably written with an undergraduate audience in mind. It is dependent mostly on secondary sources and is written in a prosaic style with little originality. The book covers Russian engagement with its “near abroad.” It examines Russian foreign policy institutions, the role of policymakers, the influence of military and security bodies, internal debates, and policy implementation. The author contrasts different periods of Russian foreign policy between 1991 and 2008 and uses the well-worn ideological categories of “liberal Westernizers,” “pragmatic nationalists,” and “fundamentalist nationalists” (introduced by Alexei Arbatov in the 1990s) to distinguish the different approaches toward foreign policy by Russia’s elites (p. 61). The author’s analysis overall is superficial. Chapter 4, “The Discursive Antagonism of ‘Russia’ and ‘the West,’” is just six pages long, and one section in that chapter, called “The Former Soviet Space through Western Eyes,” gets just over a page. The book describes institutions, leaders, and the evolution of Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin and Putin, but without any nuance or novel arguments. The text is unlikely to stimulate much debate in the classroom. Throughout the book—but particularly in part III, which deals with Georgia—there are errors that should have been caught by the author or by the book’s editors (in places, it looks like the copyeditor has not read the text—see last paragraph on page 93). There is repetition from chapter to chapter and some simple errors. Georgia was not made “a full part of Russia” in 1801, rather the kingdom of Kartl' Kakheti was annexed to the Russian Empire; declaring that there was a “fierce policy of Russification” after annexation needs far more nuance; Gamsakhurdia should be properly transliterated (the author writes “Gamzakhurdia”); Georgia did not become part of the Soviet Union in 1921, because the Soviet Union did not yet exist; Georgia was not “Menshevik” in 1918–21 (the Georgian social democrats broke with the RSDLP in October 1918), and references to the “St. Petersburg” intelligentsia at this time should surely be modified or footnoted (St. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd in 1914 and Leningrad in 1924). Ideally, a book that focuses on Russian-Georgian relations should have some Georgian sources (I could not see any in the bibliography), but even if only Russian sources are used, they should be used accurately. It looks like most of the research was done in Moscow in 2013–14. There are no acknowledgments to Georgian research or academic institutions or any interviews between the author and Russian or Georgian policymakers. Interviews would have significantly enriched the book but they are not referenced, if they indeed took place. But it is not just the rather sloppy approach. Descriptions of Georgians’ relations with their national minorities, and of the war with Russia in 2008, are a misreading of the events. To suggest that in the 1990s Russia respected Georgian territorial integrity is ludicrous (p. 97). Officially, maybe, but Russia was heavily involved militarily during the Georgian-Abkhazian war in 1992–93 supporting the Abkhazian side (I was in Abkhazia in 1993 and can testify to Russian artillery shelling Sokhumi). There is still debate over who started the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, although overwhelming evidence now confirms that Putin had planned the invasion long before August. To boldly assert, as the author does, that “Georgian forces initiated a military offensive against the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali” shows a disregard for careful sifting of the evidence and ignores the context of Russian provocations leading up to the war (p. 139). The war in Abkhazia in 1992–93 and in South Ossetia in 2008 should not ignore the concerns of the Abkhazians and the South Ossetians, but these were wars largely engineered from above. The book, unfortunately, is not always a reliable account of Russian-Georgian relations historically and only superficially so between 1991 and 2008. It is poorly edited, and I would not recommend it for classroom teaching at the undergraduate level. There are no maps or illustrations to help the reader understand the complex geography surrounding Russian-Georgian relations (or photographs). It will be very hard for the reader unacquainted with the region to identify and locate the cities and administrative units such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Maps illustrating the conflicts would have been particularly useful.
Source: The Russian Review
DOI: 10.1111/russ.70020
Author: Stephen Jones
Institution: Harvard University
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4408725656