Work

Longtermism and aggregation

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: Advocates of longtermism point out that interventions which focus on improving the prospects of people in the very far future will, in expectation, bring about an astronomical amount of good (or agent‐neutral value). As such, longtermists claim we have compelling moral reason to engage in long‐term interventions. In this paper, I show that longtermism is in conflict with plausible deontic scepticism about aggregation. I do so by demonstrating that, from both the ex‐ante and ex‐post perspectives, longtermist interventions generate extremely weak claims of assistance from future people.

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70007

Author: Emma Curran

Institution: University of Oxford

Language: English

Topic: Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,900

Funder: Arts and Humanities Research Council