Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This article examines the meta-stance choice in the scientific realism debate. I propose that the epistemological aspect of this debate be reframed within an epistemological framework that views our cognitive activities as a trade-off between believing truths and minimizing errors. I identify two main alternatives to this meta-epistemological framework: firstly, the view that the realism debate involves a voluntary choice between incommensurable stances, such as an empirical and a metaphysical stance; secondly, the notion that stance selection is a result of negotiating between explanatory power and error avoidance. My proposal and the two alternatives have in common that they imply a form of epistemic voluntarism and explain the recurring stalemate in the debate. However, I argue that the presented proposal outclasses the competing perspectives due to its enhanced generality, impartiality, a more comprehensive explanation of the anti-realist sentiment, and its potential to mitigate the recurring stalemate.
Source: Philosophers Imprint
DOI: 10.3998/phimp.6016
Author: Raimund Pils
Institution: University of Salzburg
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4408777451