Work

School Segregation and Outside Options

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: ABSTRACT We study an allocation problem in which students share school preferences but differ in their outside options. We examine the ex‐ante Pareto efficient (and weakly fair) allocations. Their main qualitative property is positive sorting; students with higher outside options are assigned to better schools. This result points out the tension between the policy goals of desegregation and efficiency and cautions policymakers about the difficulty of aligning these two objectives.

Source: Journal of Public Economic Theory

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70025

Author: Sumeyra Akin

Institution: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: bronze

Funders: Yale University, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo