Non-causal laws: an alternative hypothesis to Armstrong’s hypothesis
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Non-causal laws have long been a thorn in David Armstrong’s side. This paper aims to provide a more accommodating framework for these laws within Armstrong’s metaphysics of laws of nature. Armstrong proposed the hypothesis that non-causal laws supervene upon causal laws. In this paper, I present arguments against Armstrong’s hypothesis and propose an alternative hypothesis: non-causal laws are fundamental laws, not supervenient upon causal laws. Additionally, as some non-causal laws are functional laws, this paper will also delve into characterising the nature of functional laws. Finally, I will demonstrate how my conception of non-causal laws solves the identification problem posed by Bas van Fraassen.
Author: Eduardo Castro
Institution: University of Beira Interior
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4408896193
