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Coexistence Of Profit-Seeking And Rentseeking Behaviors As An Evolutionary Stable Strategy In A Large-Population Playing The Field Model

Year: 2024

Type: article

Abstract: This paper explores the coexistence of productive, profit-seeking behavior and unproductive, rent-seeking behavior using an evolutionary game approach. It identifies a unique Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) and shows how the prevalence of unproductive agents directly influences the incentives to either engage in productive activities, modeled on Cournot competition, or participate in rent-seeking contests, similar to the Tullock framework, for a share of the productive sector's output. The paper further explores how institutional factors—such as the marginal return to contest participation and government taxation of the productive sector—affect the spread and persistence of rent-seeking behavior. In line with empirical evidences, the analysis highlights how unproductive behaviors can become entrenched and pervasive within a population, influencing the long-term evolution of economic systems.

Source: Textos de Economia

DOI: 10.5007/2175-8085.2024.e103772

Authors: Jaylson Jair da Silveira, Felipe Coelho Sigrist

Institution: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: diamond

Funders: Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina