Work

Disability insurance screening and worker health

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: We provide new evidence on the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force participation, program spillovers, and worker health. To do so, we analyze Austrian workers after a workplace injury that experience differential levels of application screening. We find that when workers face stricter screening, they are more likely to remain in the labor force. However, we estimate no statistical differences in any physical or mental health outcomes, and can rule out large effects on overall healthcare utilization. Our findings imply that imposing stricter DI screening can yield large fiscal benefits, on the margin.

Source: Journal of Health Economics

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2025.102986

Authors: Alexander Ahammer, Analisa Packham

Institutions: Johannes Kepler University of Linz, National Bureau of Economic Research, IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Vanderbilt University

Language: English

Topic: Retirement, Disability, and Employment

Subfield: Demography

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Decent work and economic growth, Good health and well-being, Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $4,260