Work

The three-player lowest unique number game

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: This paper characterizes the unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the three-player version Lowest Unique Number Game. In this game, each player chooses a positive integer simultaneously and the player with the lowest unique number wins. The equilibrium mixing is shown to have full support and it is characterized by a constant hazard rate which is around . 46 . • Three-player Unique Number Game. • Analytical characterization of symmetric equilibrium. • Equivalence to dynamic exit games.

Source: Economics Letters

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112299

Author: Balázs Sentes

Institution: University of Hong Kong

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,030

OpenAlex ID: W4408938182

FWCI:

Cites: 4

Cited by:

Related to: 10