How agency alliances with complementors moderate quality assurance, product originality, and success in platform ecosystems
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Previous research on platform ecosystems has mainly focused on the relationships between users, complementors, and platform owners. However, the growing presence of agencies within platform-based markets has received little attention. Complementors are affiliated with an agency or work independently when offering products on a platform-based market. This study investigates the impact of agency affiliation on complementor success and explores how this relationship is influenced by product quality assurance and originality. Using a panel dataset of 188 mobile game applications from Google Play, we employ Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation to analyze agency alliance direct and moderating effects on complementor performance. Our findings indicate that an agency alliance is positively associated with complementor performance. However, it is better to work independently when complementors are capable of developing products that can differentiate themselves from competitors. This study contributes to the literature by shedding light on agencies' role as intermediaries within platform ecosystems and expands our understanding of platform dynamics. • Explores agency alliances’ direct and moderating effects on complementor performance. • Empirically tested the hypotheses using a dataset of mobile game applications from Google Play. • Suggests that agency alliances generally have a positive effect on complementor success. • Also suggests that complementors with strong product differentiation capabilities benefit more from operating independently. • Contributes to the literature by enhancing our understanding of platform agencies as intermediaries between complementors and users.
Source: Digital Business
Authors: JiYu Kim, Jaesun Yeom, Han-Gyun Woo
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,630
Awards: G176428302, G758712543
OpenAlex ID: W4408984303
