Year: 2025
Type: letter
Abstract: Bergson • Free will • Determinism I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Yasushi Hirai and Mark Sinclair for their insightful comments.This gratitude extends both to comments presented in this special issue and to their earlier feedback on many of the arguments whose articulation led up to the publication of the monograph.I am particularly delighted that the comments in this special issue have come specifically from them.Both have been my great exemplars for how I read Bergson: Mark Sinclair (not only) for his meticulous accuracy and contextual interpretation of Bergson qua Bergson; Yasushi Hirai (not only) for the courage to take Bergson in new and unconventional directions.Regardless of whether such a characterization of their two styles of scholarship is accurate, my book has tried to do both.My thanks also go to Jakub Čapek and Pavel Arazim-organizers of the workshop on Bergson's philosophy at Charles University in Prague (8-9 January 2024), which this symposium resulted from-and the editors of this journal for agreeing to publish it.My reply is divided into two sections.The first section covers points raised by Sinclair and Hirai that I feel I can cogently respond to.The second section addresses points of critique that I feel much less confident I can dodge. IThe first critical point regards the limitation of my focus to Bergson's dissertation.For example, Hirai states that "one limitation [of the monograph] […] is that Moravec focuses solely on Bergson's first major work," and Sinclair claims that "Moravec
Source: Continental Philosophy Review
Author: Matyáš Moravec
Institution: Queen's University Belfast
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,090
OpenAlex ID: W4409101518