The Use of Brain–Machine Interfaces in Human and Nonhuman Beings: Philosophical-Theological Implications for Morality
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This is an accepted article with a DOI pre-assigned that is not yet published.This article aims to discuss the philosophical-theological implications deriving from scientific evidence in relation to the use of brain-machine interfaces (BMIs). By reflecting on the neuroscientific foundations for human freedom through BMI’s experiments, the legal and ethics scholar Nita Farahany distinguishes freedom of choice from freedom of action and argues for the key role played by freedom of action (rather than freedom of choice) to account for legal and moral responsibility. However, it has been demonstrated that, similarly to human beings, also monkeys can use BMIs to perform their desired movements with artificial/robotic arms; I will discuss these studies and argue that also non-human beings actualise their intended actions by deliberating through their freedom of action. This strongly suggests that morality is not a uniquely human phenomenon but it is present, although in an “embryonic stage,” also in non-human creatures. I will argue that this also has an impact on the way we describe the notion of imago Dei.
Source: Zygon®
DOI: 10.16995/zygon.17654
Author: Luca Settimo
Institution: University of Nottingham
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,630
OpenAlex ID: W4409155730