Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper critically engages with André Abath’s Knowing What Things Are: An Inquiry-Based Approach (2022), which develops an erotetic account of knowledge about what things are. According to Abath, to know what X is, one must know propositions that serve as appropriate answers to the question “What is X?” within a given inquiry context. While this view successfully accommodates variations in epistemic demands across contexts, I argue that it overlooks the role of deal-breaker propositions - false claims that fundamentally undermine knowledge ascription, even when surrounded by otherwise accurate information. By introducing the notion of relative essences, I propose an amendment to Abath’s account that accounts for the epistemic weight of these propositions. This refinement strengthens the erotetic view by addressing cases where misleading assertions obstruct knowledge transmission.
Source: Manuscrito
Author: VERONICA CAMPOS
Institution: Jesuit School of Philosophy and Theology
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4409217203