Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: We provide several attacks on the BASS signature scheme introduced by Grigoriev, Ilmer, Ovchinnikov and Shpilrain in 2023. We lay out a trivial forgery attack which generates signatures passing the scheme's probabilistic signature verification with high probability. Generating these forgeries is faster than generating signatures honestly. Moreover, we describe a key-only attack which allows us to recover an equivalent private key from a signer's public key. The time complexity of this recovery is asymptotically the same as that of signing messages.
DOI: 10.62056/avl86chdj
Authors: Simon-Philipp Merz, Kenneth Paterson, Àlex García
Institutions: ETH Zurich, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4409253343