Year: 2024
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: This work presents a novel, black-box software-based countermeasure against physical attacks including power side-channel and fault-injection attacks. The approach uses the concept of random self-reducibility and self-correctness to add randomness and redundancy in the execution for protection. Our approach is at the operation level, is not algorithm-specific, and thus, can be applied for protecting a wide range of algorithms. The countermeasure is empirically evaluated against attacks over operations like modular exponentiation, modular multiplication, polynomial multiplication, and number theoretic transforms. An end-to-end implementation of this countermeasure is demonstrated for RSA-CRT signature algorithm and Kyber Key Generation public key cryptosystems. The countermeasure reduced the power side-channel leakage by two orders of magnitude, to an acceptably secure level in TVLA analysis. For fault injection, the countermeasure reduces the number of faults to 95.4% in average.
Institutions: Yale University, Virginia Tech
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Awards: Collaborative Research: FMitF: Track I: Automating and Synthesizing Parallel Zero-Knowledge Protocols, SaTC: CORE: Small: Automatic Detection and Repair of Side Channel Vulnerabilities in Software Code, Collaborative Research: SHF: Small: Enabling Caches and GPUs for Energy Harvesting Systems, Collaborative Research: FMitF: Track I: Automatic Discovery and Verification of Database Query Transformations, Collaborative Resaerch: SHF: Medium: Ensuring Safety and Liveness of Modern Systems through Dynamic Temporal Analysiss, DASS: Accountability from Attention, not Assumption
OpenAlex ID: W4409282605