Year: 2024
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: Hardware accelerators have been widely deployed in many machine learning applications due to their superior performance and energy efficiency. However, these accelerators are vulnerable to fault injection attacks, compromising their integrity and reliability. In particular, recent studies have revealed a targeted attack on black-box DNN models, which, through glitching the execution of the fully connected (FC) layer, is capable of derailing the DNN outputs to arbitrary classes. To defend DNN accelerators against this severe attack, this paper proposes a selective and permuted recomputation scheme. Instead of adopting dual or triple modular redundancy, which incurs high overhead, the proposed scheme selects a subset of critical FC outputs for recomputation. Meanwhile, it permutes the computation of the FC layer to prevent an adversary from pinpointing the exact time of executing the target class. The proposed defense is evaluated on three popular DNN models, namely, ResNet-50, InceptionV3, and MobileNetV3. Results show that under fault injection attacks, it can successfully recover 90--95% of the models' original accuracy, achieved with less than 1.61% runtime overhead and no storage overhead.
Authors: Jhon Ordoñez, Chengmo Yang
Institution: University of Delaware
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Funder: National Science Foundation
OpenAlex ID: W4409282689