Year: 2025
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: This paper studies a generalized variant of the Colonel Blotto game, referred to as the Colonel Blotto game with costs. Unlike the classic Colonel Blotto game, which imposes the use-it-or-lose-it budget assumption, the Colonel Blotto game with costs captures the strategic importance of costs related both to obtaining resources and assigning them across battlefields. We show that every instance of the Colonel Blotto game with costs is strategically equivalent to an instance of the zero-sum Colonel Blotto game with one additional battlefield. This enables the computation of Nash equilibria of the Colonel Blotto game with costs in polynomial time with respect to the game parameters: the number of battlefields plus the number of resources available to the players.
Author: Stanisław Kaźmierowski
Institution: University of Warsaw
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4409365264